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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07COLOMBO728 2007-05-18 09:09 2010-12-16 21:09 SECRET Embassy Colombo
VZCZCXRO9322
OO RUEHBI RUEHLMC
DE RUEHLM #0728/01 1380922
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 180922Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6072
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0407
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0115
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 7096
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 5189
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3756
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0973
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 3828
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1087
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2907
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 7682
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 5363
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO PRIORITY 0209
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2046
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
Friday, 18 May 2007, 09:22
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 COLOMBO 000728
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
MCC FOR S GROFF, D TETER, D NASSIRY AND E BURKE
EO 12958 DECL: 05/18/2017
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, PHUM, MOPS, CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: GSL COMPLICITY IN PARAMILITARY
FACTIONS’ HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
REF: A. COLOMBO 591 B. COLOMBO 561 C. COLOMBO 463 D. COLOMBO 460 E. 2006 COLOMBO 2056 F. 2006 COLOMBO 1896 G. 2005 COLOMBO 2157 H. 2004 COLOMBO 1219
Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b, d)
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Allegations of government complicity in crimes committed by organized paramilitary groups have mounted in the last year. Paramilitaries such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)-breakaway Karuna group and Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) have helped the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) to fight the LTTE, to kidnap suspected LTTE collaborators, and to give the GSL a measure of deniability. The GSL, which denies any links to paramilitary groups, has recently touted its efforts to improve its human rights record, such as the re-publication of procedures on arrests and detentions and the appointment of a “One-Man Commission” to investigate reported disappearances (ref C). However, these efforts so far appear aimed more at improving Sri Lanka’s image abroad and have yet to produce concrete improvements in the human rights situation. Outside the capital, the incidence of human rights abuses has continued, including extrajudicial killings, abductions, child trafficking, extortion, and prostitution. President Rajapaksa’s government, strapped for cash, has cut direct payments to paramilitaries initiated by former President Kumaratunga and instead turns a blind eye to extortion and kidnapping for ransom by EPDP and Karuna. While many of the charges against the government have been made in public fora, a growing number of trusted Embassy contacts, often at personal risk, have described in detail the extent of the GSL’s involvement with paramilitary groups. END SUMMARY.
GSL Finds Paramilitaries Useful
-------------------------------
¶2. (S) The GSL sees several advantages in allowing paramilitary groups to operate in the country. Paramilitary groups in the North and East help the GSL fight the LTTE and compete with the LTTE for public support and new recruits. These groups also enhance security in Colombo by kidnapping and sometimes killing those suspected of working with the LTTE. Frequent abductions by paramilitaries keep critics of the GSL fearful and quiet. Ultimately, the GSL’s objective is to turn Karuna and EPDP leader Douglas Devananda into pro-GSL political leaders in the East and North, respectively. The government hopes this will ensure long term control over these areas even if some form of devolution is instituted.
¶3. (S) In the meantime, these paramilitary groups give the GSL a measure of deniability. XXXXXXXXXXXX
told us that some military commanders in JaffnaXXXXXXXXXXXX want to clamp down on paramilitaries but have orders from Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa to not interfere with the paramilitaries on the grounds that they are doing “work” that the military cannot do because of international scrutiny. On XXXXXXXXXXXX confided to XXXXXXXXXXXX that the Defense Ministry had instructed him not to interfere with “military intelligence” operations (ref E).
COLOMBO 00000728 002 OF 006
¶4. (S) The GSL has a history of funding paramilitary groups. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that under former President Kumaratunga, the GSL had begun the practice of paying paramilitaries to refrain from engaging in criminal pursuits. Several Embassy interlocutors have independently confirmed this. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the current government, cash-strapped, has ended this arrangement. Instead, he alleged, Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa has authorized EPDP and Karuna to collect the money from Tamil businessmen. This may account for the sharp rise in lawlessness, especially extortion and kidnapping, that many have documented in Vavuniya and Colombo. Even though EPDP and Karuna are each comprised nearly exclusively of ethnic Tamils, the crimes that they commit are almost always against other Tamils.
Karuna Group Becomes Pre-eminent Paramilitary
---------------------------------------------
¶5. (S) The Karuna faction’s formal name is Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), which means “Liberation Tigers of the Tamil People” in Tamil. This name is an attempt to sap legitimacy from the LTTE by taking the “Liberation Tigers” part of their name. In less than one year since Karuna returned to Sri Lanka, the TMVP has become the most powerful paramilitary organization in the country. It began in 2004 when Karuna broke away from the LTTE, taking about 4,000 Tiger cadres with him (ref H). After the LTTE struck back, inflicting serious losses, then-President Chandrika Kumaratunga helped Karuna escape to the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, where he remained until July 2006. He remained active in managing his cadres even while living abroad. Since returning to Sri Lanka, Karuna has used strong-arm tactics to establish a powerful paramilitary group that operates under government protection (ref D).
Abductions and Killings
-----------------------
¶6. (S) The Karuna group is probably the most active Sri Lankan paramilitary in abductions and extrajudicial killings. XXXXXXXXXXXX confided to PolOff that even MPs fear that the GSL will use Karuna to assassinate them. XXXXXXXXXXXX echoed this anxiety to us XXXXXXXXXXXX. A number of XXXXXXXXXXXX MPs, Muslims as well as Tamils, have told us privately that they fear for their lives. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that he believed Karuna set up the assassination of Tamil MP Joseph Pararajasingham on Christmas Day 2005 (ref G) with the help of EPDP leader Devananda. XXXXXXXXXXXX was also positive that Karuna cadres were employed in the killing in Colombo of popular Tamil MP Nadarajah Raviraj on November 10, 2006 (ref F).
¶7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed that Karuna has extended his activities to Jaffna from his base in the East. XXXXXXXXXXXX has documented XXXXXXXXXXXX abduction cases in Jaffna XXXXXXXXXXXX, many of which he believes are the responsibility of the Karuna group. XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff that he was discouraged XXXXXXXXXXXX told us he has
COLOMBO 00000728 003 OF 006
evidence of XXXXXXXXXXXX. However, because of XXXXXXXXXXXX and limited resources, he was only able to document a sample XXXXXXXXXXXX.XXXXXXXXXXXX described one abduction in which a man suspected of having ties to the LTTE was taken and a “calling card” was left with a picture of Karuna on the front and a calendar on the back, indicating that the man’s “time had run out.”
Child Soldiers
--------------
¶8. (S) The TMVP is allowed to operate throughout the East in close proximity to SLA bases, often with clearly underage cadres guarding its camps with machine guns. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the GSL allows Karuna’s cadres to recruit children forcibly from within IDP camps in the East. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the average age of Karuna recruits is 14. XXXXXXXXXXXX’s allegation that Karuna recruits children from IDP camps with the tacit approval of the military was confirmed by XXXXXXXXXXXX. We have received confidential reports of the Karuna group’s recruitment and use of child soldiers from a U.S.-based NGO as well.
Extortion and Prostitution Rings
--------------------------------
¶9. (S) Karuna does not have the international fund-raising network among the Tamil Diaspora that the LTTE has built over the past 25 years. As a result, he has resorted to a wide range of criminal activities. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that when the GSL brings in shipments of food and supplies to IDP camps from Colombo, Karuna’s cadres are given the opportunity to go through the shipment first. They are allowed to take any food they need for themselves, as well as any supplies they believe they can sell, with only the left-overs making their way to the IDPs.
¶11. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX also explained that Karuna operates prostitution rings out of the IDP camps to “take care of” GSL soldiers, stating that the women “had no choice” but to acquiesce to Karuna cadres’ demands. XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX independently described how women are forced into prostitution, or to give up their children to traffickers. The methods are similar to those in Jaffna (paras 17-18). Families sometimes try to arrange their daughters’ marriages at the age of 12 or 13 in the hope that it will reduce the likelihood of their being forced into prostitution.
¶12. (S) Although the GSL has consistently denied supporting Karuna, XXXXXXXXXXXX allowed PolOff to listen to tapes of his interview with Gothabaya. The Defense Secretary was effusive in his praise for Karuna and the
SIPDIS benefits the GSLXXXXXXXXXXXX
COLOMBO 00000728 004 OF 006
Making Karuna Legitimate
------------------------
¶13. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX The TMVP does not yet have the status of a formal political party. According to Sri Lanka’s Constitution, new parties cannot register when an election is “pending” in any part of the country. Elections for local councils are long overdue in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, which are now in constitutional limbo following the October 1, 2006 Supreme Court decision to de-merge the two provinces. As a result, the GSL must find an existing political party for Karuna to “join,” perhaps later changing the name to TMVP, in order for Karuna to stand for elections. XXXXXXXXXXXX said thatXXXXXXXXXXXX has so far resisted GSL efforts to force a shotgun marriage with Karuna, but that he may ultimately have to yield.
EPDP: “Political Party” and Paramilitary
-----------------------------------------
¶14. (S) The EPDP, originally called the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), began as a rival to the LTTE. One wing of the EPRLF founded the EPDP as a formal political party when its leader, Douglas Devananda, was elected to Parliament in 1994 and aligned with the government. Devananda continues to hold the single parliamentary seat his party won in the 2004 election. As part of the ruling coalition, he serves as Minister of Social Services and Social Welfare. Although registered as a formal political party, the EPDP remains a feared paramilitary group, wielding non-official power over parts of the Jaffna peninsula and especially the offshore islands with the tacit approval of the Sri Lanka Army.
Extra-Judicial Killings with the Military’s Support
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶15. (S) Working in concert with SLA soldiers stationed in the Jaffna peninsula, the EPDP is able to conduct extortion, abductions, extra-judicial killings and other criminal acts without fear of consequences, according to numerous sources. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us about EPDP’s involvement in extra-judicial killings in Jaffna. Independently,XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed much of XXXXXXXXXXXX’s account. He explained that when the EPDP intends to kill a target, they first provide notice to the military. The number of soldiers patrolling the streets of Jaffna (40,000 total on the peninsula) is such that there are literally soldiers stationed at every street corner. At an agreed time, all of the soldiers in the designated area take a five to ten minute “break” at once (although the normal practice is to take breaks in shifts). At that point, armed and masked gunmen, often riding on motorcycles, race down the street and assassinate the intended victim. Shortly after the killing, the soldiers’ break over, they return to their posts to deal with the aftermath. While police investigations are common, they almost never lead to arrests. XXXXXXXXXXXX also told us of a XXXXXXXXXXXX doctor XXXXXXXXXXXX who performs forced abortions, often under the guise of a regular check-up, on Tamil women suspected of being aligned with the LTTE.
COLOMBO 00000728 005 OF 006
¶16. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX Child Trafficking
-----------------
¶17. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he believes that EPDP is operating child trafficking rings in Jaffna with a base on Delft island, which the EPDP “owns.” XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that because of the large number of widows in Jaffna, men associated with the EPDP, often from neighboring villages, are used to seduce women with children, especially girls, with the promise of economic protection. After establishing a relationship, the men then take the children, sometimes by force and sometimes with the promise that they will be provided a better life. The children are sold into slavery, usually boys to work camps and girls to prostitution rings, through EPDP’s networks in India and Malaysia. XXXXXXXXXXXX maintains that children are often smuggled out of the country with the help of a corrupt Customs and Immigration official at Bandaranaike International Airport in Colombo..
¶18. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX’s story was partially verified by XXXXXXXXXXXX who stated that the EPDP works in concert with the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) to operate Tamil prostitution rings for the soldiers. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that young women were taken and forced to have sex with between five and ten soldiers a night. Sometimes they are paid approximately a dollar for each “service.” The young women’s parents are unable to complain to authorities for fear of retribution and because doing so would ruin the girls’ reputation, making it impossible for them ever to marry. Families have begun arranging marriages for their daughters at a very young age in the hopes that the EPDP and soldiers will be less likely to take them. In addition to trafficking in children, XXXXXXXXXXXX detailed how the EPDP operates an illicit alcohol smuggling ring using child “mules.”
U.S. Takes a Hard Line against Paramilitaries
---------------------------------------------
¶19. (S) Addressing the activities of these paramilitaries and their blatant disregard for human rights is a top priority of the Embassy. Ambassador, DCM and Pol Chief have met repeatedly with the President, the Foreign Minister, Foreign Secretary, Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa, Human Rights Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe and others to emphasize the importance of reining in these groups and ending the abductions, killings, and other human rights abuses. Visiting senior USG officials, including Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) Richard
SIPDIS Boucher and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for SCA Steven Mann have delivered tough messages on human rights to the highest levels of the GSL, noting that continued abuses could affect defense cooperation.
COLOMBO 00000728 006 OF 006
¶20. (S) COMMENT: While none of the evidence put forward by our contacts constitutes a smoking gun, the preponderance of these statements ) and the extent to which they independently corroborate each other ) points to a pattern of GSL complicity with paramilitary groups on multiple levels. It appears that this involvement goes beyond merely turning a blind eye to these organizations’ less savory activities. At worst, these accounts suggest that top leaders of its security establishment may be providing direction to these paramilitaries. While it is perhaps understandable that the GSL wants to use every possible means in its war against LTTE terror, we must continue to stress to the Government the importance of reining in the paramilitaries and establishing internationally accepted norms for arresting, investigating, prosecuting and, if appropriate, punishing those suspected of cooperating with the LTTE. BLAKE
---------------------------------
07COLOMBO830, SRI LANKA: TAMIL TIGERS SIPHON OFF PART OF
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
* The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
* The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
* The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07COLOMBO830.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07COLOMBO830 2007-06-12 03:03 2010-12-16 21:09 SECRET Embassy Colombo
VZCZCXRO2125
OO RUEHBI RUEHLMC
DE RUEHLM #0830/01 1630323
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 120323Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6228
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0455
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0178
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 7159
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 5266
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3814
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1062
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 3886
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1119
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2972
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 7746
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 5407
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO PRIORITY 0235
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2109
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
Tuesday, 12 June 2007, 03:23
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000830
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
XXXXXXXXXXXX
EO 12958 DECL: 06/11/2017
TAGS PTER, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: TAMIL TIGERS SIPHON OFF PART OF
INTERNATIONAL RELIEF FUNDS
Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In late May PolOff met the XXXXXXXXXXXX described the LTTE’s complete control of all activities that take place in Tiger-controlled territory, including forced conscription and the use of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) to extract money from XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX also criticized the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission’s (SLMM) complacency in the face of coercive techniques the LTTE employs to maintain control of its northern stronghold. On June 8, after meetings with representatives from UNICEF, UNHCR and the World Food Program to discuss how these organizations fund projects operating in the Vanni, Emboffs confirmed that in some circumstances INGOs are required to work with TRO to accomplish their project goals. END SUMMARY.
FORCED CONSCRIPTION
-------------------
¶2. (C) On May 21, PolOff met XXXXXXXXXXXX private organization that provides assistance to refugees. XXXXXXXXXXXX described the LTTE’s “one person per family” forced conscription program. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the Tigers require at least one person between the ages of 18 and 35 per family to fight for the LTTE, apparently believing that if the “draftees” are at least 18 years old, the international community cannot criticize the Tigers for requiring military service. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the LTTE provides written notice to draftees with orders to report to a particular military office for service. If they fail to report, they are taken forcibly, often at night.
¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the average age of LTTE “recruits” is now 17 years old. He confirmed, however, XXXXXXXXXXXX allegation of forced conscription of those 17 years old and older, stating that if a person failed to leave the Vanni before he or she turned 17, there was an extremely high likelihood of being drafted by the Tigers.
¶4. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX accused the SLMM of turning a blind eye to LTTE forced conscription of Tamil citizens living in the Vanni. XXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX that “all countries are entitled to institute the draft to protect their borders.”
¶5. (C) We have received other credible reports of even more draconian conscription methods used by the Tigers. Some families are reportedly being told to provide two recruits as the LTTE prepares for war. The Tigers may threaten families living in the Vanni or elsewhere in Sri Lanka if their children do not return from jobs abroad, such as in the Persian Gulf, to take up arms.
TRO FUNDING LTTE OPERATIONS
---------------------------
COLOMBO 00000830 002 OF 003
¶6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us the LTTE had ordered INGOs to provide all project funding through local NGOs, which are managed collectively by the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO). For example, XXXXXXXXXXXX receives money in its bank account from its headquarters or from international donors, then deposits the money into a separate bank account operated by a local NGO. The local NGO’s director is always a member of TRO, as are many other members of the local NGO staff. The TRO representative withdraws the money from the local NGO’s account, provides a cut to the LTTE, and distributes the rest to accomplish the particular project XXXXXXXXXXXX is funding with that donation. XXXXXXXXXXXX then oversees the implementation of the program, but does not control any distribution of funds after they are transferred into the local NGO’s account.
¶7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that XXXXXXXXXXXX alleges that it does not comply with the LTTE’s funding demands, but in reality, it does comply by removing its funding one additional step. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the UN provides funding to international voluntary organizations,XXXXXXXXXXXX who then comply with the LTTE’s funding demands, thus providing XXXXXXXXXXXX with a measure of distance and “plausible deniability.” XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that in addition to XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX of the XXXXXXXXXXXX organizations XXXXXXXXXXXX operating in the Vanni are complying with the LTTE procedures. XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶8. (C) One June 8, Emboffs met with XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that UNCHR did not work through TRO representatives in the Vanni, but could not say whether INGOs did so. XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed that although the UN does not work through the TRO, it does provide some funding to Is and local NGOs. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that he was aware of times when XXXXXXXXXXXX were asked to work with local program managers who are likely representatives of the LTTE, but he was unsure whether this requirement extended to funding arrangements. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the LTTE needs food supplies so badly that the WFP has successfully rebuffed LTTE attempts to levy taxes on items brought into the Vanni. He added that although the WFP does not provide financial assistance to the Tigers, he knows that several XXXXXXXXXXXX are required to provide financial resources to the LTTE through the TRO in order to accomplish their objectives in the Vanni.
¶9. (S) COMMENT: According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, other organizations have not complained about LTTE interference in their operations because they suffer from “a blinding case of clientitis.” However, one could also argue that amounts to a simple acceptance of the realities of working in LTTE-controlled territory. XXXXXXXXXXXX anecdotal evidence of TRO serving as a conduit to channel funds to the LTTE strikes us as authentic. Although Post was unable to confirm XXXXXXXXXXXX allegations with the same level of detail that XXXXXXXXXXXX described, XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX both acknowledged that XXXXXXXXXXXX
COLOMBO 00000830 003 OF 003
have at least some involvement with the LTTE through the TRO. Our sense is that the money derived from these charities probably goes to fund the LTTE administration in the territory it occupies, rather than arms purchases. The LTTE’s internal revenues are likely minuscule compared with what it raises abroad from the Tamil Diaspora. It is probably these overseas revenues that are used to purchase arms for import into the Vanni. BLAKE
----------------------------
DOCTORS FROM NO-FIRE ZONE RELEASED ON BAIL
09COLOMBO830 2009-08-24 13:01 2010-12-16 21:09 SECRET Embassy Colombo
VZCZCXRO9628
OO RUEHBI
DE RUEHLM #0830 2361334
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 241334Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0429
INFO RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1863
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 8883
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 7122
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5099
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3256
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 5056
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1335
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0593
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4166
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 9462
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 6763
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO PRIORITY 1262
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3694
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
Monday, 24 August 2009, 13:34
S E C R E T COLOMBO 000830
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
EO 12958 DECL: 08/23/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PREF, PHUM, EAID, MOPS, CE
SUBJECT: DOCTORS FROM NO-FIRE ZONE RELEASED ON BAIL
REF: COLOMBO 695
Classified By: CHARGE D’AFFAIRES JAMES R. MOORE. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
¶1. (S) Four government doctors, held by the police Criminal Investigation Division (CID) since the end of the war in May for allegedly filing false reports on civilian casualties in the No-Fire Zone during the last several months of the war, were released on bail today. XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶2. (S) The doctors XXXXXXXXXXXX had been pressured to give the press conference held in early July (reftel), where they recanted all the statements they had made from the No-Fire Zone. They said they were heavily coached for the press conference, given specific lines to say, and even practiced with several members of the local media beforehand. They said they XXXXXXXXXXXX had not lied when giving their original statements during the war.
¶3. XXXXXXXXXXXX.
¶4. XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶5. (S) Comment: The release of the four doctors is a welcome step by the GSL, but clearly they remain under investigation by the CID and now also are potentially under threat of abduction or extrajudicial killing. Post will continue to monitor the situation very closely, but for now the doctors appear to want to maintain as low a profile as possible, without undue attention brought to them either in Sri Lanka or internationally. End Comment. MOORE
------------------
SRI LANKA: ASSESSING PROGRESS ON KEY ISSUES
10COLOMBO50 2010-01-22 09:09 2010-12-16 21:09 SECRET Embassy Colombo
VZCZCXRO7020
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHLM #0050/01 0220900
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 220900Z JAN 10 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1149
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2286
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 9308
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 7563
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5388
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3723
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 5313
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0174
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0835
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4435
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 9871
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 7158
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO PRIORITY 0169
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0016
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
Friday, 22 January 2010, 09:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000050
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
EO 12958 DECL: 01/22/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PREF, PHUM, PTER, EAID, MOPS, CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ASSESSING PROGRESS ON KEY ISSUES
REF: A. 09 COLOMBO 1176 B. COLOMBO 32 C. COLOMBO 8
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Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
¶1. (S) According to Congressional mandates and Administration policy, U.S. assistance to Sri Lanka, particularly military assistance, is tied to progress by the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) on several key issues, including treatment of IDPs, human rights, political reconciliation, and accountability for alleged crimes perpetrated by GSL troops and officials during the war with the LTTE. The GSL has progressed more or less on each of these issues since the end of the conflict. Continued or increased U.S. assistance, however, hinges on the GSL broadening and deepening this progress.
¶2. (S) Outlined below are these key issue areas with discussion of what progress has been made so far and what further progress we would like to see. It is important to note that we are not offering this list as a set of “benchmarks,” which the GSL must meet to qualify for more robust engagement. Our experience with benchmarks in the Sri Lankan context (and elsewhere as well) is that the government often makes notable progress but in areas not anticipated, or in ways not foreseen, by our benchmarks. Thus, the following list of favored steps is not meant to be exhaustive but rather illustrative. Actual progress will have to be assessed as it happens.
¶3. (S) It also is important to note that the upcoming presidential election -- particularly if it were to result in an opposition victory -- could radically alter the political context of our assessment of GSL progress on key issues. Opposition candidate General Fonseka has made many significant promises in each of these issue areas, and we could expect that his new government would be interested in moving forward more quickly than the Rajapaksa government. Nevertheless, the key issue areas of concern remain the same notwithstanding the election, and we would expect any Sri Lankan government to continue to make progress. Please note that our lists of “Next Steps” are not in any order of priority or importance.
IDPs
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¶4. (S) There has been a dramatic improvement in the treatment of IDPs and their living conditions over the past several months. Whether because of international pressure or electoral politics, the result is that 106,007 displaced persons remain in GSL camps, according to UNHCR, down from a high of over 280,000. Large numbers who left the camps remain in transit camps or with host families and have not yet returned to their places of origin. Although humanitarian access to camps has been inconsistent since the end of the war, most organizations reported that access was now granted upon request. Protection monitoring and confidential interviews with IDPs are still prohibited, and the ICRC revised mandate has not been finalized. ICRC headquarters is assessing whether to accept the GSL offer of a general rather than a detailed MOU. Access to returnee areas for INGOs is still limited to those engaged in de-mining and one medical organization in the Vanni, although the government and local authorities were reportedly working to extend this to other groups. INGOs in Jaffna were recently authorized to work by the Governor of the North but await confirmation from the Presidential Task Force.
¶5. (S) Next steps:
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-- Renew ICRC mandate. -- Provide transparent criteria and regularized processes for INGO access to the north. -- Provide transparent criteria and regularized processes for access to returnee areas for journalists. -- Continue to release or prosecute LTTE and other Tamil detainees according to a judicial process. -- Implement a national system for tracing separated family members. -- Continue GSL reintegration of returnees.
Human Rights
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¶6. (S) Numbers of disappearances have experienced a steady and significant decline across the island since the end of the war, and the Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of Human Rights and Disaster Relief, and other institutions have conducted investigations into some of the cases. For example, on December 21, Attorney General Peiris told Ambassador that there was an 11-person team working under Deputy Solicitor General De Livera to look into questions of disappearances and other potential violations under the Emergency Regulations (ref A). Peiris claimed that 100 (presumably innocent) people had been found in detention and released during the previous 45 days, and the team was continuing its investigations. He was going to Anuradhapura himself later that week to look at 33 cases and to decide whether the suspects could be released.
¶7. (S) Child soldiers affiliated with the TMVP have been significantly reduced over the past year, with just five reportedly remaining at the end of 2009, according to UNICEF; the government appears to be working actively to find the remaining child soldiers. On January 13, imprisoned journalist J.S. Tissainayagam was released on bail, and Post is not aware of any additional physical attacks on journalists since June, although there still have been threats.
¶8. (S) Next steps:
-- Disappearances continue to decline, and investigations continue to rise. The team under A.G. Peiris, in particular, should examine and process more cases. -- All remaining child soldiers accounted for and discharged/rehabilitated. -- Press freedom: threats to individual journalists must end, along with atmosphere of intimidation. -- Press freedom: progress made in investigation of the killing a year ago of Sunday Leader editor Lasantha Wickramatunga. -- Remaining ex-LTTE “new” detainees, held since the end of the war, are placed within a legal structure. All “older” LTTE and Tamil detainees, held since before the end of the war, are charged and prosecuted or released. -- Lifting the Emergency Regulations. -- Less harassment and intimidation of civil society organizations.
Political Reconciliation
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¶9. (S) Although progress has been slow, the presidential elections -- particularly the fact that the two main candidates are splitting the Sinhalese vote -- has moved reconciliation issues higher on the political agenda. The A-9 road has been opened for nearly all travel by Sri Lankans (NOTE: Foreigners are still not permitted to drive into the North. END NOTE.), the curfew in Jaffna has ended, and fishing restrictions in the North have been largely
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eliminated. Of the 12,000 ex-LTTE combatants held in detainment camps since the end of the war, 712 were released the week after the New Year, and the government has announced it would release an additional 1,000 shortly. General Fonseka has made reconciliation a prominent issue in his campaign, signing a ten-point program for devolving power to the North-East. In addition, in his widely distributed campaign manifesto, Fonseka has promised he would: (a) abolish the Executive Presidency; (b) reactivate the 17th Amendment to the Constitution; (c) end the culture of “white van” disappearances and extra-judicial killings; (d) eliminate the press council and establish an environment of free media; (e) return all remaining IDPs and double the resettlement allowance they receive to 100,000 rupees (about USD 880); (f) amend the Emergency Regulations; and (g) deal with all war-related detainees by either prosecuting them, releasing them, or placing them in rehabilitation programs.
¶10. (S) Next Steps:
-- Some sort of power-sharing or decentralization arrangement to accommodate minority rights. Should be locally developed (i.e. not necessarily the 13th Amendment) and satisfactory to minority populations in Sri Lanka. -- Lifting of High Security Zones. -- Unrestricted access permitted throughout the North for all Sri Lankans, diplomats, journalists, and NGOs. -- Remaining no-threat or low-threat ex-LTTE combatants in “new detainee” camps are released or placed into rehabilitation programs. -- Any low-risk “older” LTTE detainees convicted within the justice system are removed from prison and placed into rehabilitation programs.
Accountability
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¶11. (S) Accountability for alleged crimes committed by GSL troops and officials during the war is the most difficult issue on our bilateral agenda, and the one we believe has the lowest prospect for forward movement. There are no examples of a sitting regime undertaking wholesale investigations of its own troops or senior officials for war crimes. In Sri Lanka this is further complicated by the fact that responsibility for many of the alleged crimes rests with the country’s senior civilian and military leadership, including President Rajapaksa and his brothers and opposition candidate General Fonseka. Moreover, the fact that the LTTE leadership has been destroyed and there is virtually no one to hold accountable for LTTE war crimes makes prosecutions of GSL troops or officials that much more difficult.
¶12. (S) Accountability also has not been a top priority for Tamils in Sri Lanka. While Tamils have told us they would like to see some form of accountability, they have been pragmatic in what they can expect and have focused instead on securing greater rights and freedoms, resolving the IDP question, and improving economic prospects in the war-ravaged and former LTTE-occupied areas. Indeed, while they wanted to keep the issue alive for possible future action, Tamil leaders with whom we spoke in Colombo, Jaffna, and elsewhere said now was not time and that pushing hard on the issue would make them “vulnerable” (ref. B).
¶13. (S) Despite these considerations, there have been some tentative steps on accountability. Soon after the appearance of the State Department Report to Congress on Incidents, President Rajapaksa announced the formation of an experts’ committee to examine the report and to provide him with recommendations on dealing with the allegations. At the end of the year, the president extended the deadline for the
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committee’s recommendations from December 31 until April. For his part, General Fonseka has spoken publicly of the need for a new deal with the Tamils and other minorities. Privately, his campaign manager told the Ambassador that Fonseka had ordered the opposition campaign to begin work planning a “truth and reconciliation” commission (ref. C).
¶14. (S) Rajapaksa Next Steps:
-- Presidential experts’ committee makes credible recommendations for dealing with the allegations in the State Department report. -- A commission is formed to hear complaints and resolve individual cases of war disappearances. -- GSL publicly acknowledges human cost of war and losses on both sides. -- President institutes compensation program for families of civilians killed in the war.
¶15. (S) Fonseka Next Steps:
-- Begins national dialogue on the war and its human costs. -- Creation of a serious and credible truth and reconciliation mechanism. -- Considers compensation program. BUTENIS
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