Ahead of the parliamentary polls in Sri Lanka, President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his ruling SLFP-UPFA combine could not have asked for better allies than the US and UK. Between them, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Foreign Secretary David Miliband may have revived the already-fading memories of the LTTE in the minds of the average Sinhala voter. Add to that the 'American intervention' of the kind that US Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Blake, made on the 'Fonseka arrest episode' and the divided Opposition in Sri Lanka can count out this poll, too - after the disastrous start their unity provided in the presidential polls earlier in the year.There is no denying the Anglo-American interest in the restoration of human rights, as per their perceptions and prescriptions for and in Sri Lanka. There is also no denying the increasing international concern for an early political settlement to the ethnic issue. It may also owe to the perceptions of individual nations about the impressionist politics of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora, starting with the violent end to the 'Eelam War IV' and thus to the 'larger Tamil cause' in the island-nation.
Harsh words and harsher measures of the kind leave a bad taste. People may forget it, politicians may forgive them, but institutional mechanisms of permanent bureaucracy in every country have a memory that is both rigorous and retrievable. When it is all over, and the Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Fonsekas of the island-nation may have their rights restored - be it political or personal - in whatever form that would pass muster in the eyes of the international community.
Among them, those that believe in astrology, or those that are fatalists, as most Sri Lankans do, may even dismiss it as a passing phase that could not have been avoided. Yet in the Establishment Sri Lanka, those memories would remain. The victim-hood of a small nation would continue to haunt future relations between nations and peoples, independent of what the political class of the day could prefer.
In a recent media interview, President Rajapaksa said how the West was offering 'humanitarian aid' and not 'developmental assistance' that his country badly needs. The message was clear. Now that the ethnic war was behind the nation, Sri Lanka would go to whoever offered 'developmental assistance'. China and Russia would fit the bill - as neither would also ask uncomfortable questions on the rights front. The two are also 'veto powers' in the UN Security Council. So, no sanctions, please….
The way the Sri Lankan Government handled the GSP-Plus issue after the EU made its decision known with a six-month notice for the withdrawal of concessions to take effect should have sent out a clear signal to other nations wanting to 'arm-twist' Colombo into accepting their yard-stick for good governance. Or, at least that is how officials and ministers in the Sri Lankan Government have sought to indicate their understanding of the increasing concerns of the West towards human rights violations of one kind or the other.
If the idea was for the EU to hope that the fear of losing elections would bring around the Rajapaksa dispensation to do their bidding on the human rights front, it should have known better. As much as the European Union, domestic political critics of the Sri Lankan Government have been talking about the loss of jobs if and when the GSP-Plus facility was withdrawn, long before the 'ethnic war' came to an end. That did not cost President Rajapaksa his office in the re-election - not even votes, if one were to draw out figures in this connection.
Today, ahead of the parliamentary polls, it is the European Union that is talking about restarting the dialogue with a post-poll administration in Colombo, for the EU to revisit its decision on GSP-Plus. Clearly, the European Union officials in Colombo and Brussels do know as to who runs the show under the Executive Presidency scheme in Sri Lanka - or, which party or alliance is most likely to win the parliamentary polls.
The success of the military campaign that the now-detained Gen Fonseka led against the LTTE owed to a variety of coordinated factors, starting with the direction that the political leadership gave, and the risks that it was willing to take in terms of pressures of the GSP-Plus kind that the international community was ready to apply even before the conclusion of the 'terrorism-driven' war. If anything, it only helped the political leadership and the Government to keep up the rousing sentiments of 'Sri Lankan nationalism', as different from 'Sinhala chauvinism'.
It is not as if the average Sri Lankan (read: Sinhala, if you wish) is against the Government offering an acceptable political solution to the Tamil community. Throughout the ethnic war, when national and personal security were on the top of the minds of the citizenry, they seldom engaged in discourses on issues such as power-devolution and political solution. Now, when they may be physically ready for the change-over, they are mentally pre-occupied still with one election after another, as their political leaders and their parties are.
GSP-Plus to GTF-Plus - II
Fonseka's candidacy in the presidential elections and his detention since, have helped to retain the campaign focus of the parliamentary polls on the war, yet. The days of the average Sri Lankan voter taking about 'human rights' as understood by the West may still be far away. It is in this background the posturing by US Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Blake, commands attention.
It is another matter that the Blake statement was followed by the British Foreign Secretary David Miliband addressing the Global Tamil Forum (GTF) at London, and his Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, appearing with the GTF delegates on the House of Commons complex. That they all happened in a week when the International Crisis Group (ICG) came up with a long report, urging the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora to distance itself from the ways and waywardness of the LTTE should not be overlooked, either.
Whatever the intention, Secretary Milliband's speech is open to interpretation that he was not against the GTF's goal but only against the LTTE's ways. Whatever be the domestic political and electoral compulsions, if any, the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary conferred a rare honour on the GTF, considering that it was only the inaugural session of the organisation.
By observing that the one-time LTTE-centric Tamil Nationalist Alliance (TNA) back home "should not fail representing the hearts of the Tamils", the GTF also indicated that it did not possibly represent any credible Tamil political party in Sri Lanka, capable of negotiating a political settlement with the Sri Lankan State and the Sinhala polity. It is anybody's guess how the Tamil politics in Sri Lanka would be played out during the run-up to the parliamentary polls, or how the TNA or any other would conduct their affairs in the post-poll scenario, particularly in the context of finding a negotiated settlement to the 'ethnic issue', which is still a live concern.
It is possible that the British Government and the ruling party may be hoping that early recognition for what they may perceive as a moderate Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora grouping may motivate them to stay on the narrow path. The GTU is identified with those Diaspora groups that are actively creating a 'trans-national Tamil government'. It is also wedded to the idea of 'self-determination', internal and external, as defined in the 'Vadukottai resolution', for the creation of a 'Tamil Eelam' -- and not the 'Oslo Declaration', where the reference was to internal self-determination.
Does it all imply that the GTF would act as a pressure-point not only on the Sri Lankan Government and the Sinhala polity, but also on the Tamil polity nearer home - and could count on the blessings of the West, starting with the UK? It is one thing even for the EU to take a collective decision on GSP-Plus but another for the UK, a member of the European Union, to make a political posturing of the kind that has far-reaching consequences for Sri Lanka, its domestic politics and international relations.
If the idea is to encourage the Diaspora not to take to the LTTE's ways, and to 'encourage' the Sri Lankan Government to talk to them, negotiations of the kind would make sense only if the GTU leaders and members transplant themselves to native Sri Lanka. There is however nothing to suggest that any or all of them is anywhere close to being keen on adopting such a personal decision - which alone could have far-reaching political consequences of the kind envisaged.
With Assistant Secretary Blake doing some tough talking on the Fonseka arrest, as if they were all timed well, the Anglo-American efforts at holding the Sri Lankan Government and the Rajapaksa leadership accountable for whatever they are now being charged with can only prove counter-productive. For starters, Colombo lost no time in not only criticising the British and American Governments, it also reiterated its decision to haul up Fonseka also before the civil courts - as much as the military court. So much for good intentions, did you say?
Politics and political leadership in Sri Lanka have moved away from the urban elite, for good. Independent of the 'war victory', Candidate Rajapaksa's election in 2005 and re-election since are indicative of the changing voter-perception of his national leadership. Fonseka may have followed, but he came too early, with too little to offer and too little time to gain wider acceptance in the social and societal planes, where he may have belonged in political terms.
Despite the urban-rural divide and elitism and non-elitism still being at the centre of the national political discourse, the turn for the Fonsekas with little or no political background may have come in good time. S W R D Bandaranaike seemingly took post-Independence politics away from the urban elite, to rural elite. Slain Premadasa took it away from the elites of all kinds - but it was all short-lived. Rajapaksa's election and elevation were in the natural course of socio-political evolution that could only be delayed but not denied.
The choice of President Rajapaksa over Candidate Fonseka is indicative yet of the voter-preference for a time-tested politician over a testy General, who was at the wrong place at the wrong time - but was made to believe that he was at the right place at the right time. What more, Candidate Rajapaksa first, and President Rajapaksa since have known that they are contesting nearer home - and their constituency and concerns are nearer home - real and realistic, and that there was nothing 'ethereal' about them.
The attitudes, approach, lingo and body language of the new-generation leadership in Sri Lanka is different from what the West has got used to It happened with the Tamil leadership long ago - it is happening in the larger Sinhala polity now. Even when a change was sought, the preference was for a Fonseka, not a return to a Ranil W - not to mention that an endorsement by a Chandrika Kumaratunga made any difference. The shoe, it needs to be understood and acknowledged, is on the other foot. It is also pinching….